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How Do Reservation Prices Impact 
Distressed Debt Rescheduling? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper is the first to investigate rescheduling of distressed corporate debt when both the 
representative shareholder and the creditor face reservation prices. Parties expect from rescheduling 
both recovery and growth, but reservation prices are key dimensions to consider in the analysis in 
order to assess the opportunity and to design the new financial set-up. For reservation price, creditor 
may have in mind the liquidation value of the firm he can get by a strict enforcement of his 
contractual rights in court. The shareholder requires from rescheduling the recognition of her risky, 
specific and important (financial and intangible) involvements in the future. To shed lights on 
rescheduling with reservation prices, we develop first a general parsimonious distribution-free 
structural framework. We derive sufficient conditions for rescheduling to take place and highlight 
situations where no rescheduling can occur. We characterize cases where rescheduling is for the 
creditor possible but sub-optimal. So the shareholder’s reservation price can dramatically restrict the 
set of possible extensions and it does matter for the creditor. We then restrict our setting to undertake 
numerical analysis, our benchmark being the canonical rescheduling model of Longstaff (1990). 
Here, we can explore with simulations feasibility and optimality of rescheduling for different 
magnitudes of reservation prices and different firm’s profiles. We finally investigate various concerns 
related to rescheduling such as agency costs, exit from no-rescheduling situations and bargaining 
between stakeholders. We find and discuss different ways to lower the shareholder’s reservation 
price. 
 
Keywords: distressed debt, bankruptcy costs, debt rescheduling, reservation price, contingent claim 
analysis, business risk. 
JEL classification: G 33. 
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1. Introduction 
Rescheduling2 is a popular way to reorganize capital structure and to renegotiate 
corporate debts in distress (Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994)). Both empirical 
evidences and anecdotic observations reveal that debt restructuring almost systematically 
involve rescheduling (cf. Gilson et al. (1990)). On principle, rescheduling is a mean to 
postpone existing financial demands and constraints. It can have however many other merits 
as shown by the rich corporate finance literature on the debt maturity design (see Fan et al. 
(2012) for a recent study). This is especially the case when the new maturity is cooperatively 
designed by both the debtor and the creditor, because we can expect both interests to be taken 
in account. 
When dealing with distressed debts, avoidance of liquidation costs is commonly 
recognized as the first determinant to decide rescheduling (Micucci and Rossi (2010)). 
Longstaff (1990) notably develops a contingent claim analysis with liquidation costs. A piece 
of recent literature develops his canonical model further (see Harding and Sirmans (2002), 
Moraux and Navatte (2007), Chen et al. (2008) and Lee and Chung (2009))3. In all these 
contributions, the creditor designs the rescheduling alone and he chooses the new debt 
maturity without facing special constraints. Consequently, it is sufficient for him to compare 
the price of the new rescheduled debt to the realization value he can get by seizing the 
distressed firm and liquidating the assets. In this vein of modeling, the representative 
shareholder appears surprisingly passive4. Of course, a strong argument for this passiveness 
is that she is better off in all rescheduling scenarios because her participation in the distressed 
firm is simply worth nothing.  
                                                     
2 Throughout the paper, rescheduling and debt maturity extension are synonymous. 
3 Harding and Sirmans (2002), for instance, demonstrate in this setting that maturity extension aligns interests of 
borrowers and lenders better than renegotiation of principal and forgiveness do. And effectively, Franks and 
Sussman (2005) report only one case of debt forgiveness in their rich database made of 542 bank restructurings 
of small to medium size UK companies. 
4 A notable exception is Moraux and Navatte (2007) who remark that the shareholder-manager has strong 
incentives to change the risk profile of the firm before entering renegotiation. 
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Analysis of existing literature reveals that all past contributions consider a unique 
reservation price: the liquidation value of the firm’s assets for the creditor5. Other way 
saying, offering an epsilon to the shareholder is sufficient to make rescheduling possible. In 
the canonical framework, she has just no reservation price and is assumed to be essentially 
passive. Rescheduling is designed by the creditor as if he is “myopic” and “lazy”, i.e. as if his 
decision just relies on a simple rule based on the liquidation value only. Of course, from a 
strict contractual viewpoint, considering passiveness and no reservation price for 
shareholders is completely correct. Once again, equity is worth nothing and, as recalled by 
Franks and Sussman (2005), the creditor “has an exclusive right to decide whether, when and 
how to seize the company’s assets and liquidate them”.  
Reality is of course not that simple and some remarks deserve to be done. First of all, 
this somewhat mechanical view significantly contrasts with empirical findings. Franks and 
Sussman (2005), for instance, report that UK bankers behave far more subtly in the treatment 
of financial distress. They also find only mitigated results with respect to “lazy banking”6. 
Second, a too literal “contractualist” approach clearly excludes what is meant by 
“negotiation”. In this sense, the canonical setting of Longstaff (1990) and followers where 
rescheduling is automatic and imposed by the creditor is outrageously asymmetric and in 
favor of this latter. Third, if rescheduling intervenes without consulting shareholders, then the 
traditional agency cost of Jensen and Meckling (1976) is certainly exacerbated. Nothing 
indeed prevents the so-called “passive” shareholder to act strategically after the “agreement” 
and, why not, at the creditor’s expense. The creditor can then face ex post damaging changes 
of the business profile and/or some risk-shifting operation (see recent empirical evidences 
reported by Eisdorfer (2008) and Esmer (2013)). The bottom line of this is that the creditor 
may be worse not to involve the representative shareholder during the rescheduling design. 
                                                     
5 The “reservation price” perspective developed in this paper has neither been explicitly recognized elsewhere 
nor exploited in any mean by former contributions. 
6 For short we can retain four issues: a) “banks’ typical response to distress is an attempt to rescue the firm 
(rather than liquidate it automatically)”, b) “banks do not hurry to exercise their liquidation rights and engage 
in a fairly elaborate rescue process”, c) “bank’s decision to liquidate a firm is sensitive to the firm’s own 
restructuring efforts, such as replacing its managers” and finally d) “banks show an interest in the going 
concern value of the firm and do not confine themselves to valuing the firm’s collateral”. 
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The corporate finance perspective on the ongoing concern of the firm and the 
associated shareholder’s behavior also questions the absence of such a reservation price. 
Observing that a shareholder has no reservation price is not good news for the creditor. This 
is equivalent to detecting that the shareholder has nothing to lose entering the deal7. By 
entering what resembles a gamble for resurrection, she will act accordingly and the creditor 
may face after the “renegotiation” an extreme version of the asset substitution effect as 
discussed in-depth in Décamps and Faure-Grimaud (1998, 2000). Existence of a reservation 
price means by contrast that the shareholder is ready not to accept any rescheduling. Some 
rescheduling are just too minor to be conducted. When reservation prices exist and 
rescheduling is decided, the creditor (resp. the representative shareholder) can be reassured 
on the willingness/interest of the representative shareholder (resp. the creditor) to support the 
recovery project. The creditor can in particular consider the representative shareholder has a 
positive view on the future perspectives of the firm. In this sense reservation prices may 
reveal some private analysis. With this in mind, it is clear that assuming a non-zero 
reservation price for the shareholder is not necessarily a bad news for restructuring, the 
targeted recovery and the creditor’s wealth. 
This paper is the first to develop a general distribution-free framework to analyze 
rescheduling of distressed corporate debt with reservation prices. It also extends the 
canonical setting of Longstaff (1990) to stress quantitative consequences of introducing a 
shareholder’s reservation price. Our aim is to enrich the traditional view on rescheduling 
decision by introducing a reservation price for the representative shareholder and to 
investigate consequences on the debt maturity design. Of course, one may expect this “new” 
dimension to constrain, limit and prevent in some contexts corporate debt rescheduling. 
However, the precise quantitative effect of the reservation price remains difficult to intuit. 
First, the magnitude of the reservation price depends on the shareholders’ preference that 
may be quite heterogeneous. Second, the magnitude of the reservation price may vary with 
the rescheduling design according to the shareholders’ preference. The shareholder's decision 
                                                     
7 Another issue, we do not elaborate further, concerns the affective value in the eyes of the shareholder. Some 
shareholders could really face some difficulties to up-date their “beliefs” on the firm by confronting figures to 
reality and accepting the close-to-zero dollar value of equity in case of severe distress. For more discussion on 
such a behavioural issue, one refers to Davis et al. (2011). 
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is indeed to enter (or not) a restructuring activity with a specific time dimension. This activity 
is moreover costly and risky until it comes to a happy end. Consequently, it appears 
important to consider situations where reservation prices are constant or alternatively depend 
on the duration of the rescheduling period8. In all cases, we expect debt rescheduling to differ 
significantly from the standard setting that simply neglects shareholder’s reservation price. 
The reservation price we introduce is the minimum value the representative 
shareholder has in mind to obtain from restructuring. This price acts for her as a threshold 
that triggers the decision to enter or not the risky deal. It doesn’t impact directly the value of 
the firm’s assets but it can significantly influence the total value of the firm (which is the 
total value of the claims) once the rescheduling is decided, through the design of the new 
financial set-up. Nothing is therefore paid as an investment. The reservation price is just a 
useful benchmark to appreciate the new equity price. We can more concretely understand the 
reservation price as the present value of extra compensations required to reward or to attract 
for some specific talents or skills, such as for example a deep knowledge of the industry. 
Here, the reservation price is a virtual (rescheduling-dependent) “floor” dollar-compensation 
inciting to invest in a distressed firm with a specific saga. Accounting for a reservation price 
is also a way to bring into the model the value of other opportunities and exit options the 
shareholder can have in her portfolio. Finally, such a parameter can introduce a kind of 
behavioral dimension in a traditional contingent claim analysis9. Once a non-zero reservation 
price is taken into account, the post-restructuring value of equity is constrained to be more 
than epsilon. So, part of the shareholder’s wealth is involved in the on-going business. 
Consequently, she is incited to commit herself to ensure recovery and success, far more 
reasonably and strategically than in the canonical setting. Once again, existence of a non-zero 
reservation price for the shareholder is not per se bad news for other stakeholders. This 
amount must be balanced with the talent and skills of the representative shareholders and the 
expected return, recovery and growth of the firm’s assets.  
This paper contributes to the literature by a) introducing reservation price of 
shareholders in the analysis of rescheduling, b) showing that and how reservation prices may 
                                                     
8 We thank the referee for this idea. 
9 See footnote 7. 
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prevent alignment of interest between creditors and debtors, c) highlighting examples where 
rescheduling is actually feasible in an optimal way for creditors, just feasible or impossible to 
implement. In addition, we investigate potential exit solutions such as a change in the 
business model, introduce bargaining power of parties and resolve the associated asymmetric 
Nash bargaining game. Overall, the paper revisits the contingent claim analysis by 
considering (for the first time to the best of our knowledge) a couple of reservation prices in 
rescheduling. In simulations, we essentially capitalize on Longstaff (1990) and followers for 
benchmarking purposes10. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our structural 
framework equipped with a reservation price for the representative shareholder and one for 
the creditor. Section 3 introduces (distribution-free) analytical results and consequences of 
such reservation prices. We expose there the constrained optimization problem the creditor is 
supposed to solve. Section 4 undertakes simulations. Section 5 discusses a number of 
additional issues such as the asset substitution problem and the possibility to design the 
optimal rescheduling as the solution of an asymmetric generalized Nash bargaining game. 
Section 6 provides empirical implications. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The structural framework and problem statement 
This section develops a parsimonious two-period setting to investigate rescheduling 
of distressed debt in presence of reservation prices. It must be stressed (and this will become 
clearer below) that the nature and the length of the two periods are not expected to be the 
same. The first one is given and deduced from the debt contract maturity, while the second 
one is endogenous and results from the design of rescheduling. It should be clear that a 
                                                     
10 Our analysis partly benefits from the (contingent claim) analysis of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton 
(1974), because the representative shareholder owns a call option written on the firm’s assets. An important 
difference exists however because the expiration of the call is endogenous and chosen by the creditor. The call 
expiration actually solves a constrained optimization problem and, if possible, the creditor will choose the 
optimal investment horizon highlighted by Longstaff (1990). It is shown hereafter that this situation can occur 
only in special situations. In any case, some well known properties of the equity price do not hold anymore, 
because structural parameters can influence the endogenous horizon. Our aim in this investigation is to derive 
distribution free results. However we consider that the firm’s asset value process can only diffuse after 
rescheduling meaning that it cannot jump... Diffusion processes introduce sufficient randomness in the analysis 
while avoiding dramatic problems when considering multiple threshold crossings in the reasoning. 
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continuous time environment is preferable for modelling the optimal horizon on the second 
period. 
Let it be a levered firm whose assets are currently worth 0V  and whose capital 
structure consists of equity and a single discount bond maturing at time 1T  and promising a 
face value 1F . The equity is held by a representative shareholder. At the end of the first 
period that is at time 1T , the firm can experience financial distress and rescheduling. The 
length of the second period is chosen by the creditor and eventually accepted by the 
representative shareholder. Financial markets contain riskless assets paying a constant 
interest rate denoted by r. Information is free and there is no tax, nor transaction costs, but 
there are some costs associated to the liquidation of bankrupt firms. Consequently, our 
setting is not perfect as per Modigliani and Miller (1958) and the total value of the firm is not 
equal to the firm’s assets value. Rather, the total value of the firm is the firm’s assets value 
net of imperfections that is minus the expected value of liquidation costs.  
At the end of the first period (i.e. debt maturity 1T ), the creditor effectively receives 
the face value 1F  if the firm’s assets value is sufficient to cover the due payment ( 11 FVT  ). 
Otherwise and in case of no rescheduling, he can only get the liquidation value of assets as 
recovery upon default. This value amounts to 
1T
V , where  1,0  is the realization rate of 
the firm's assets. 
1T
V  constitutes a natural reservation price for the creditor to assess the 
advantage of any restructuring decision in case of default. Liquidation costs (amounting to 
 
1
1 TV  here) give the creditor a clear incentive to restructure debt and extend the debt 
maturity.  
To decide and design a maturity extension at time 1T  in case of default, the creditor 
rationally compares the continuation value of their debt to the reservation price. The 
continuation value of the debt is the value of the rescheduled debt  ;,, 211 TFVD T  assuming 
for a while that the new maturity 2T  is given. We denote by 12 TT   the associated time to 
maturity. The continuation value depends on liquidation costs because liquidation can still 
occur at time 2T . The reservation price for the creditor is equal to 1TV  (the realization value 
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of the firm) because he can alternatively seize the firm and immediately liquidate the assets. 
Overall, the creditor’s net gain function of rescheduling is given by 
   
    
    








212122
12
121212122
12
111
1
11
;,,;,,
1
1
2121debt
TTTFVT
TTr
TTTTFVFVT
TTr
TTT
dVVVfVFe
VdVVVfFVe
VTFVDTFVH
T
TT



 (1) 
where A1  is the indicator function that is worth 1 if A is verified and 0 otherwise,  
12 TT
VVf  
is the risk neutral distribution of the firm’s assets value at time 2T  conditional on its value at 
time 1T . Note that the third equality applies because the discounted value of the firm’s assets 
is a martingale under the risk neutral setting. The net gain function  ;,, 21debt 1 TFVH T  can be 
positive, negative or null depending on structural parameters, on the rescheduling design 
(i.e., the choice of 2T  or  ) and on the distribution of the firm’s assets value. Of course, the 
creditor will extend the maturity of his debt (in distress) if and only if his net gain function is 
positive and by favoring, among possible horizons, the one offering the maximum net gain. 
The optimal rescheduling period for the creditor solves the following (unconstrained) 
optimization problem 
  ;,,maxarg 11debt0 1  TFVH T         (2) 
where   represents the length of time to new maturity. This is the traditional setting to 
investigate and understand rescheduling, where no constraint is placed on the set of possible 
horizons (see Longstaff (1990)). If ever the representative shareholder has no reservation 
price, rescheduling is automatically executed with an optimal duration denoted by   *L . It 
is worth noting that, for virtually all interesting distributions for the time 2T -value of the 
firm’s assets, the optimal horizon must be found numerically. Fortunately, the objective 
function debtH  has nice properties among which a maximum value at horizon 
*
L  and a 
specific horizon denoted by demaxT  (or by  demaxT  if one wants to emphasize the dependence to 
liquidation costs) beyond which it is negative and strictly decreasing (with 1
de
max
de
max TT   the 
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associated duration)11. One may denote by     ;,,;,, 2121debt 11 TFVDTFVW TT   the wealth of 
the creditor at rescheduling. 
Now, consider that the representative shareholder has a reservation price and denote it 
generically by K . One will assume for a while that K  is constant and that the new maturity 
2T  is given. The benchmark function used by the representative shareholder to assess 
rescheduling at time 1T  is defined by the wealth she can expect from rescheduling minus the 
reservation price she has in mind or more formally: 
         KdVVVfFVeKTFVWKTFVH TTTFVTTTrTT T    2121221211 ;1,,;,, 121eq21eq , (3) 
where the integral expression captures the expected value of the discounted wealth the 
representative shareholder can obtain at time 2T . For a given 2T , the time 1T value of the 
shareholder’s wealth is the time 1T value of a call option written on the firm’s assets12. 
Option theory (see for instance Merton (1973, theorem 1)) then tells us that wealth is strictly 
increasing with time to maturity 12 TT  . We therefore expect the shareholder to be better off 
increasing the rescheduling horizon, unless the reservation price depends on the extra granted 
duration in a way that balances the effect of time (this kind of shareholder’s preferences is 
discussed below). The benchmark function exposed in equation (3) can be positive, negative 
or null depending on structural parameters, on the rescheduling design (i.e. the choice of 2T ) 
                                                     
11 Actually, the third equality of expressions (1) implies that the creditor’s net gain function admits a maximum 
with respect to time to maturity. To understand this heuristically, remark that, for very near horizons 2T , a 
recovery of the firm is just impossible and the event  12 FVT   is unlikely to occur so shortly after 1T . The 
function may be negative here depending on the process chosen for the firm’s assets value and associated 
parameters. As the rescheduling horizon is considered later, the value of the objective function first increases 
until *L  and then decreases before ending negative for longest horizons (beyond the horizon demaxT ). 
Consequently, there exists a maximum value for the creditor’s objective function. To understand the decreasing 
feature beyond *L , note that the creditor’s wealth at maturity is ceiled by the face value 1F  and that the 
discount factor sharply decreases to zero as the time to maturity 12 TT   gets larger. So, the objective function, 
that balances the wealth to the constant realization value 
1T
V , decreases for longer horizons. It even 
becomes negative for furthest horizons and tends to 
1T
V . This is the case, for instance, in the canonical 
model of Longstaff (1990) and in the setting we develop in section 3. 
12 See footnote 9. 
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and on the distribution of the firm’s assets value. In any case, the representative shareholder 
can accept the restructuring only if the rescheduling horizon is large enough to ensure that 
the claim she receives (the new equity) is higher than the reservation price she has in mind, 
or equivalently only if her benchmark function is positive. The bottom line of this discussion 
is that the creditor must design a rescheduling that keeps the shareholder’s benchmark 
function positive. He must therefore solve the constrained optimization problem given by 
 
 

 ;,,max 11debt
0;,,
0 1
111eq


 TFVH T
KTFVH T
.        (4) 
To capture different shareholder’s preferences, it is worth considering different 
specifications for the reservation price13. A constant reservation price will suit shareholders 
who are indifferent to the rescheduling duration. Otherwise, a reasonable reservation price is 
any strictly increasing function of the rescheduling duration, that is a any function having a 
positive first derivative with respect to the duration (or more formally   0' K  for any  ) 
because the effort lasts longer as the rescheduling period gets larger. Among possible 
duration-dependent functions, the linear specification,    kK   with k  a positive real 
number, is a simple attractive candidate. Here the parameter k  models the reward for effort 
required by the representative shareholder (per unit of time ). Depending on the specification 
for the reservation price, the benchmark function may have different properties14. When 
associated to constant reservation prices, the benchmark function eqH  has necessarily 
negative values for shortest horizons 2T  (including 1T ) and it increases as the duration 
increases. When associated to duration-dependent reservation prices, benchmark functions 
can have negative values for shortest horizons 2T 15, and then everything is possible in broad 
generality because the sensitivity of the representative shareholder’s wealth to duration is 
                                                     
13 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this fruitful development. 
14 To avoid uninteresting situations, we will consider only reasonable values for the reservation price. In the 
following section, one will derive a number of sufficient conditions to highlight when rescheduling is feasible. 
But, for the moment, it is sufficient to require the constant reservation price to be lower than the time 1T  value 
of the firm (which is of course the maximum value the shareholder can expect) and to demand the reward for 
effort per unit of time to be lower than the slope of the line that is tangent to the equity value viewed as a 
function of the rescheduling duration. 
15 depending on specification and excluding 1T  for linear specifications. 
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balanced with the one of the reservation price. The most important point is that any 
benchmark function will decrease from a (more or less) long term horizon 2T . The reason for 
this is that the wealth of the shareholder is bounded by 
1T
V , whereas the reservation price is a 
strictly increasing function of the duration  . As 2T  tends to infinity, the time 1T value of 
the representative shareholder’s wealth tends to 
1T
V  while the reservation price (unless 
constant) remains unbounded. This is typically the case, for instance, for our linear candidate 
   kK  . When the reservation price  K  is duration dependent, nothing special happens 
to the rescheduling design described by equation (4), the benchmark function of the 
representative shareholder is just modified accordingly. For a linear specification, one has 
     1221eq21eq ,,;,, 11 TTkTFVWkTFVH TT  . Compared to a setting with a constant 
reservation price K , we can then expect rescheduling to be postponed, similar or hastened 
depending on whether  K  is greater, equal or smaller than K . For very short periods  , 
the reservation price  K  is of course very small and smaller than K  so that it is less 
constraining than it (and even not constraining at all). For moderate to long period of time, 
linear specification leads to interesting situations. 
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the above constrained optimization problem 
and the associated set of possible rescheduling horizons. It is therefore worth introducing 
additional notations to qualify specific horizons. Let’s denote, for a generic reservation price 
K ,   ,,
1
* KVT  the possible extension period if any that solves the constrained optimization 
program (4), *1
*  TT  the associated rescheduling horizon.  KT eqmin  is the soonest horizon 
after 1T  such that    0;,, eqmin1eq 1 KKTFVH T  and, where appropriate,  KT eqmax  is the soonest 
horizon after  KT eqmin  nullifying the benchmark function. Of course,     1eqmineqmin TKTK   
and     1eqmaxeqmax TKTK   represent associated time-to-maturities. Superscripts ‘eq’ insist 
here on the fact that values are driven by the shareholder’s preference ( K ). The formal 
definition of  KT eqmin  is 
       KtFVWTtKtFVHTtKT TT  ,,:inf0;,,:inf 1eq11eq1eqmin 11  (for a generic 
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reservation price K ). Depending on the specification of K , this value is more or less 
difficult to figure out.  
Before ending this section, it is also worth discussing very first properties of these 
horizons under the two possible specifications of the reservation price. For constant 
reservation prices K , there exists only one maturity such that the value of the shareholder’s 
wealth is exactly worth the reservation price. And this in turn has a couple of consequences. 
First of all,  KT eqmax  does not exist. Second, a particular reservation price may be associated 
to any rescheduling horizon T  chosen by the creditor. This reservation price is special 
because it is the largest one compatible with such a rescheduling horizon. One may therefore 
denote it by  TK demax  where the superscript ‘de’ insists on the fact that the computation is 
driven by the creditor’s preference (T).  TK demax  is then unambiguously defined by 
   0;,, demax1eq 1 TKTFVH T  or equivalently    TFVWTK T ,, 1eqdemax 1 . Interestingly, for a given 
reservation price K , the creditor will (or not) be able to find an optimal rescheduling horizon 
 ,,
1
* KVT T . In case he can, we can look for the largest reservation price compatible with 
such a choice. Let’s denote it by  KK * . This function of K  solves 
     0;,,,, **1eq 11 KKKVTFVH TT   and one has     ,,1*demax* KVTKKK T  where no 
superscript is obvious because preferences are blended. Linear reservation prices provide 
interesting settings to consider. The role of the rescheduling duration indeed becomes rather 
subtle, because the maximum possible horizon for the representative shareholder (if any) is 
eq
maxT  - the largest values of the two solutions of   0;,, 1eq 1 kttFVH T . Moreover, when 
reservation prices depend on the duration to optimize, they are no longer exogenous but 
treated as an element of the problem. 
 
3. Analyzing distressed debt rescheduling in presence of reservation prices 
This section derives distribution-free results. The rescheduling maturity we consider 
solves the constrained optimization problem defined by equation (4) and is therefore 
endogenous. Consequently, analytical results may deviate from what can be expected from 
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the standard contingent claim analysis. Note that, for checking, we set the shareholder’s 
reservation price to zero in order to verify whether properties first highlighted by Longstaff 
(1990) are recovered. 
To begin this section, we sum up in proposition 1 the very first analytical pricing 
implications of the above distribution-free setting. Notice that we assume here that a 
rescheduling is possible. The rest of the section then highlights conditions under which 
restructuring is feasible and when and how reservation prices impact rescheduling. 
Proposition 1: If rescheduling is possible at time 1T , then new equity and debt are 
respectively worth  
      KKKVFVHKKVFVEq TTTT  ;,,,,;,,,, 1111 *1eq*1    
and  
     
11111
;,,,,H;,,,, *1debt
*
1 TTTTT VKVFVKVFVD     
where   ,,
1
* KVT  solves the equation (4) and K  is the (generic) shareholder’s reservation 
price16. The total value of the firm is the sum of both and it equals 
                
    
    1,, 1,,
,,,,,,
,,*
1
1
*
11
1
*
11
1
*11
*1,,1
*1
*
11
*
111
Q1
Q1
;11,;,,,,
FVVV
FVVV
dVVVfVeVKKVFVv
KVTT
KVTT
KVTKVFVKV
TKVr
TTT
T
T
TTKTVT
T


  








where Q  stands for the proper probability. 
 
Pricing formulae of proposition 1 are not as straightforward as they may seem at first sight 
because the maturity   ,,
1
* KVT  - if any, solves the constrained optimization problem (4). 
Equalities related to the total value of the firm emphasize in different ways that rescheduling 
postpones potential liquidation costs firms to new horizon  ,,1* KVT T . The last expression 
suggests for instance that the total firm’s value will be a strictly increasing function of the 
                                                     
16 The equity price is a function of K  only through the design of the rescheduling horizon, so formally one 
could simplify the notation to    ,,,,
11
*
1 KVFVEq TT . 
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rescheduling period for most dynamics we can consider for the firm’s assets value. Granting 
an extra period of time in standard frameworks just gives the firm more chance to recover. 
 
Proposition 2: A necessary condition for rescheduling to occur at horizon T  is that the 
generic reservation price K  and the rescheduling horizon T  verify 
   1Q1 1 FVVK TT   .         (5) 
 
Proposition 2 states that if the generic shareholder’s reservation price is larger than the time-
1T  value of liquidation costs that can be saved by offering a recovery option to the firm, then 
no rescheduling can occur. Hence, while liquidation costs at time 1T  (   11 TV ) constitute a 
key determinant for the creditor to decide rescheduling, the time- 1T  value of saved 
liquidation costs constitutes a key determinant for stakeholders to decide rescheduling. 
Proposition 2 places a bound on constant reservation prices and on slopes of linear 
specifications when a rescheduling horizon is known and, alternatively, it places a bound on 
the rescheduling horizon when the constant reservation price or the slope of linear 
specification is known. As a warning, it must be emphasized that proposition 2 states a 
necessary condition for rescheduling not a sufficient one and that it does not say anything on 
whether the horizon T  is the optimal one to consider. 
 
Proof: If rescheduling is possible with maturity T, then both the net gain function of the 
creditor and the benchmark function of the representative shareholder are simultaneously 
positive so that  
11
;,, 1 TT VFVD    and   KKFVEq T ;,, 11   where 1TT  . Now, 
summing expressions implies that the total value of the firm is necessarily larger than 
KVT 1  or more formally   KVKFVv TT  11 ,;,, 1  . Then, plugging the third equality of 
Proposition 1 gives     KVFVVV TTTT  111 Q1   and the result follows by 
simplification.            
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Corollary : Existence of a shareholder’s reservation price makes acceptance of rescheduling 
by both parties a good signal for the ongoing firm and environment. In that case, 
rescheduling is socially better than liquidation. 
 
Proof: The proof of proposition 2 reveals that if rescheduling occurs then 
  KVTFVv TT  11 ,,, 11   and therefore   11 ,,, 11 TT VTFVv   .     
 
The proposition 2 states a necessary condition for rescheduling, not a sufficient one (this is 
therefore true for the corollary too).    1Q1 1 FVVK TT    and social welfare 
(  
11
,,, 11 TT VTFVv   ) do not suffice for rescheduling to occur. There exist situations where 
no rescheduling can intervene, because conditions do not ensure that both parties are better 
off. Restructuring may take place at the expense of one party. 
 
The following proposition presents situations under which rescheduling (only) is not an 
appropriate solution. 
 
Proposition 3: For a generic reservation price K , rescheduling is impossible to undertake if 
   KTT eqmindemax  .  
 
Proof: We know from section 2 that there exists a largest horizon demaxT  beyond which the 
creditor’s net gain function is negative and the rescheduling impossible. If ever 
 KTT eqmindemax   (for a generic K ), then there is no way to satisfy both preferences.  
 
This proposition shows that a failure to reschedule is possible because preferences (which are 
functions   and the generic K ) may be irreconcilable.  
 
Corollary : In case the representative shareholder has a constant reservation price K , 
rescheduling is impossible to undertake if the reservation price verifies 
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  demaxdemaxdemax TKKK  . In case the representative shareholder has a linear reservation 
price    kK  , rescheduling is impossible to undertake if the required reward for effort per 
unit of time verifies     demax
de
max
de
maxde
max T
TKkk  .  
 
Proof: When the representative shareholder has a constant reservation price K , we also 
know from section 2 that there exists a maximum reservation price  TK demax  associated to any 
rescheduling horizon T . This in turn yields     demaxdemax1demaxdemax ,,1 KTFVWTK T  . Note that, 
because the wealth function is a strictly increasing function of T, it is a one-to-one function 
on appropriate intervals. And, because K  is constant,  demax1eq ,,1 TFVWK T  leads to 
  demax11-eq ,,1 TKFVW T   where  KFVW T ,, 11eq 1  returns the minimum horizon that fixes the 
constraint. When the representative shareholder has a linear reservation price K , then the 
larger the slope, the longer the duration required by the shareholder. And the maximum slope 
admissible with  demaxT  verifies    demax1demaxdemax ,,1 TFVWTk T      
 
The next proposition highlights, in the case of constant reservation price, conditions 
under which rescheduling is optimal and conditions under which it is feasible although not 
completely optimal. To begin with, it is necessary to reconsider the creditor’s optimization 
problem and then to shed more light on  KK *  the function introduced in section 2 that, for a 
given level of reservation price, gives the maximum reservation prices the creditor’s 
rescheduling decision can face. In section 2, it is defined by     ,,
1
*de
max
* KVTKKK T . 
 
Lemma: Consider a representative shareholder with a constant reservation price K  lower 
than demaxK . Then, the rescheduling duration is given by 
            *eqmin*eqmin* ,max,0,,max,, 11 LTT KVKKV   with   *L  the optimal 
solution of the unconstrained problem (2) or more explicitly: 
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       
 
otherwiseK
TFVWKif
KV LTLT eq
min
*
1eq
*
* ,,,, 1
1 
 . 
 
Proof: When the constant reservation price is not constraining, the rescheduling duration the 
creditor chooses is simply his first-best choice   *L  which corresponds to the optimal 
solution of the unconstrained optimization problem (2). When the constant reservation price 
is constraining (meaning that he cannot enjoy the maximum value of his net gain function), 
he has no incentive to postpone maturity beyond the horizon that exactly fixes the 
shareholder’s reservation price (he chooses  Keqmin ), because his net gain function is strictly 
decreasing beyond   *L . It is clear that the value   *1eq ,,1 LT TFVW  acts as a threshold 
reservation price. 
 
Lemma: The function  KK *  is given by     ,,,,
11
*
1eq
* KVTFVWKK TT  or more explicitly 
by 
           
 
 de
LT
LTLT
KKTFVWifK
KKTFVWKifTFVW
KK
max
*
1eq
**
1eq
*
1eq*
,,
,,,,
1
11


. 
 
Proof: The function  KK *  is the maximum reservation price the representative shareholder 
could have had given that the creditor has chosen  ,,
1
* KVT T . For any K  lower than 
  *1eq ,,1 LT TFVW , the reservation price is not binding and the unconstrained solution of the 
optimization problem applies. So the creditor chooses and implements the rescheduling 
duration   *L  and, consequently,     *1eq* ,,1 LT TFVWKK  . Interestingly,  KK *  does not 
depend on K  for reservation prices lower than the threshold   *1eq ,,1 LT TFVW . Now, for any 
K  lying between   *1eq ,,1 LT TFVW  and  demax1eqdemax ,,1 TFVWK T , one has   KKK *  
because, by virtue of the previous lemma, the creditor chooses  Keqmin  as a second-best 
meaning that the representative shareholder cannot obtain more that K . Of course, the first 
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result i) of proposition 3 states that rescheduling is impossible for any K  beyond demaxK , so 
the function is not defined beyond this point. 
 
Proposition 4: Consider a representative shareholder with a constant reservation price K  
lower than demaxK . Then, the rescheduling duration is given by 
            *eqmin*eqmin* ,max,0,,max,, 11 LTT KVKKV   with   *L  the optimal 
solution of the unconstrained problem (2) and furthermore a couple of scenarios emerge: 
 If  KKK * , then     ** ,,
1 LT
KV  , the rescheduling design is optimal for the 
creditor whose wealth is    ;,, *11 LTde TFVW  and the wealth of the representative 
shareholder amounts to   *1eq ,,1 LT TFVW  which is strictly larger than her reservation 
price, the “surplus” amounting to    KTFVW LT *1eq ,,1 . 
 If   max* KKKK  , then    KKVT eqmin* ,,1    and rescheduling is just feasible but 
suboptimal for the creditor. The creditor is better off considering  KT eqmin  as 
rescheduling horizon and all pricing formulae of proposition 1 apply (except that of 
course  Keqmin  replaces   ,,1* KVT ). In that case, the shareholder’s wealth exactly 
covers her reservation price (    KKTFVW T eqmin1eq ,,1 ) and the reservation price has a 
negative impact on the creditor’s wealth and the opportunity cost amounts to 
     KFVFV TLT eqmin1*1 ,,Debt,,Debt 11   . 
 
Proof: The function is     ,,
1
*de
max
* KVTKKK T  and it is the maximum reservation price 
the representative shareholder can have, given that the creditor chooses  ,,
1
* KVT T . It 
should be emphasized that for any K  lower than    *1* ,,1 LT TFVWKK   (which does not 
depend on K ), one has    *1* ,,1 LT TFVWKK  . Now, for any K  lying between  KK *  and 
 demax1demax ,,1 TFVWK T , one has     KTFVWKK T demax1* ,,1 . Consequently, when 
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  max* KKKK  , then    KKVT eqmin* ,,1    and it is still worth for the creditor to extend 
the distressed debt maturity. The third point iii) suggests the creditor to view the impact of 
reservation price as some opportunity costs. Actually, there is no incentive for him to grant 
more delay, otherwise surplus benefits to the shareholder. 
 
The next proposition is dedicated to linear reservation prices. If we know from 
Proposition 2 that there exist some values that make rescheduling impossible, this 
proposition specifies situations where only second-best rescheduling designs are possible and 
situations where no rescheduling can occur. Proposition 5 parallels but differs from 
Proposition 4 in various aspects. First, it is clearly related to Proposition 3 as it exhaustively 
enumerates all possible scenarios by the same way. Second, it heavily relies on the fact that 
the two parameters   and k  (that respectively influence and capture stakeholders’ 
preferences) can have unrelated values. The novelty here is that (at least in principle) the 
optimal horizon desirable for the creditor may be too far for the shareholder’s time 
preference.  
 
Proposition 5: Consider a representative shareholder with a linear reservation price  K  
such that  kT eqmin  and  kT eqmax  exist. Then one of the following scenarios emerges. 
 If      *eqmaxeqmin LTkTkT  , then    kKVT eqmax* ,,1   . The rescheduling design is 
feasible but sub-optimal for the creditor. The creditor is better off considering  kT eqmax  as 
rescheduling horizon and all pricing formulae of proposition 1 apply (except that of 
course  keqmax  replaces   ,,1* KVT ). In that case, the shareholder’s wealth in 
rescheduling just covers her reservation price (   eqmaxeqmax1eq ,,1 kTFVW T  ). There is no 
“surplus” for the representative shareholder and her reservation price has a negative 
impact on the creditor’s wealth. The opportunity cost amounts to 
    kFVFV TLT eqmax1*1 ,,Debt,,Debt 11   . 
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 If      kTTkT L eqmax*eqmin   , then     ** ,,1 LT KV  . The rescheduling design is 
optimal for the creditor and the wealth of the representative shareholder amounts to 
 *1eq ,,1 LT TFVW  which is strictly larger than her reservation price. The “surplus” is 
  **1eq ,,1 LLT kTFVW  . 
 If       demaxeqmin* TkTTL  , then    kKVT eqmin* ,,1    and rescheduling is feasible but 
suboptimal for the creditor. The creditor is better off considering  kT eqmin  as rescheduling 
horizon and all pricing formulae of proposition 1 apply (except that of course  keqmin  
replaces   ,,
1
* KVT ). In that case, the shareholder’s wealth in rescheduling just covers 
her reservation price (     kkkTFVW T eqmineqmin1eq ,,1  ). There is no “surplus” for the 
representative shareholder and her reservation price has a negative impact on the 
creditor’s wealth. The opportunity cost amounts to 
    kFVFV TLT eqmin1*1 ,,Debt,,Debt 11   . 
 If    kTT eqmindemax  , then rescheduling is impossible.  
In case there exists only one horizon eqT  such that   0;,, eq1eq 1 KTFVH T  (we have 
essentially    kTkTT eqmineqmaxeq  ), the condition for rescheduling to exist is that eqT  and *LT  
are similar or more formally that        *eq1 1,, ** LLT KV  . 
 
Proof: Scenarios depict possible situations exhaustively. All of them can exist, because 
values of parameters   and k  admit no special relation in our setting. 
 
Before ending this section, it is worth questioning whether results of Longstaff (1990) 
are recovered when K  is set to zero. Proposition 2 is still verified because the 
contemporaneous value of liquidation costs you can expect to save is strictly positive in all 
cases. Let’s now turn to Proposition 4 (resp. Proposition 5), it is sufficient to remark that 
 KT eqmin  drops to zero when K (resp. k ) is zero. This prevents both sub-optimal designs and 
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impossibility result. Consequently, Longstaff (1990) solves the unconstrained optimization 
program (2) and focuses on   ,0,
1T
V  only but     ** ,0,,0,
11 LTT
VV   . In this vein of 
reasoning, the largest reservation price compatible with Longstaff (1990) optimal 
rescheduling is   *max,*max LL KTK  . The next section proposes simulations and from now on 
we consider and extend the canonical framework of Longstaff (1990). 
 
4. Simulations 
This section makes simulations to gain intuitions (both graphically and numerically) 
about theoretical results of section 3. Because the length of the second period of our setting is 
chosen by the creditor (it is variable and endogenous), a continuous time framework is 
needed to describe the firm’s assets value dynamics at any possible rescheduling horizon. To 
keep things comparable with existing research, we use for the firm’s assets value the risk 
neutral value process considered by Longstaff (1990) and followers and we assume that 
increments over a small period of time dt are well described by 
tttt dWVdtrVdV           (6) 
where  ttWW   is a standard Brownian motion and   stands for the firm’s assets 
volatility17. Structural parameters we consider for simulations are consistent with previous 
studies. In Table 1 for instance, our base case parameters are 341 TV , 401 F , %20 , 
%6r . The realization rate  , that drives the creditor’s reservation price, can typically take 
                                                     
17 This dynamics implies that log-returns of the firm’s assets are normally distributed, but our conclusions do 
not change for other kinds of distributions. Notice that, if the new extended horizon 2T  was arbitrarily and 
exogenously fixed by the creditor, then the pricing of corporate equity and debt after rescheduling would be 
straightforward. For a new horizon 2T , indeed, the net gain function of creditors is given by          12,112,2121debt 11111121 ;,, TTdNVTTdNeFTFVH FVTFVTTrT TT     where  .N  is the 
standard cumulative density function,    
t
trxtd x 
 221
,1
ln   and     ttdtd xx  ,1,2 . Moreover, 
the representative shareholder’s one is then           KTTdNeFTTdNVKTFVH FVTTrFVTT TT   12,2112,121equity 11121111 ;,,  . However, things 
are not that simple because the new horizon is endogenously given. Finally, it is interesting to note that the 
pricing probability in Proposition 1 is        ,,Q 1111* *,11,, KVdNFV TFVKV TT  . 
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different values. There are chosen so as to emphasize a specific feature and/or lines with 
recent empirical findings. Note that Andrade and Kaplan (1998) evidence that bankrupted 
firms lost between 10% and 23% of their value upon declaring bankruptcy (on a sample of 31 
leveraged buyout firms that subsequently become financially distressed). In Bris et al. 
(2006), bankruptcy costs rise up to 20%. Two banks give to Franks and Sussman (2005) total 
proceeds concerning 542 small and medium UK companies and computations lead to median 
costs equal to 26.8% and 18.5% respectively.  
 
Figure 1 puts together four graphs that help to understand stakeholders’ preferences 
with different reservation prices. The upper left graph displays the creditor’s net gain 
function debtH  as a function of the extra period 1TT  . The upper right graph displays the 
shareholder’s benchmark function eqH  as a function of the extra period 1TT   for some 
constant reservation prices, while the lower left graph does the same for three different linear 
reservation prices. The lower right graph represents the function  KK *  that plays an 
important role in Proposition 4. In the left upper graph, we set liquidation costs to fairly large 
values ( %40  and %20' ) for illustrative purposes. We can verify there that the net 
gain function is concave (as claimed in section 2), that it is maximum when the extra period 
is equal to   *L  and that it is zero for   demax . The graph also indicates how the net gain 
function increases when liquidation costs enlarge (i.e. when   decreases). In absence of 
shareholder’s reservation price, results of Longstaff (1990) apply and the creditor should 
rationally choose   *L  as rescheduling horizon. Due to the shareholder’s reservation price, 
this is not necessary possible in our extended framework. The upper right graph displays the 
shareholder’s benchmark function eqH  as a function of the extra period 1TT   for a 
couple of constant reservation prices 7K  and 5.105.1'  KK . One may verify here the 
strict monotony of the shareholder’s benchmark function with respect to the extra period of 
time. As expected, it is an increasing function of the extra period of time. The lower left 
graph plots as a function of the extra period 1TT   three different shareholder’s 
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benchmark functions eqH  involving different linear reservation prices. For modeling 
different rewards for effort, we set 85.0k , kk 095.1'  and kk 2.1"  (given that the larger 
the slope, the more constraining the shareholder’s time-preference). This lower left graph 
well illustrates that the time-preference of the shareholder (captured by k ) is a key 
dimension to consider. Depending of the required reward for effort, the benchmark function 
eqH  may be positive only for rescheduling horizons chosen between  kT eqmin   kT eqmax , it may 
be (at best) equal to zero for a specific rescheduling horizon we denote by  kT *  or it may be 
never positive. Other way saying, the value of the equity held by the shareholder’s in the 
rescheduled financial set-up may be larger than, just equal or lower than her reservation 
price. The lower right graph finally represents the function  KK *  that plays an important 
role in Proposition 4. It shows the maximum (constant) reservation price the shareholder can 
have for the rescheduling period chosen by the creditor in accordance to a level of 
reservation price K . For reservation prices K  lower than   *1eq ,,1 TFVW T , the 
shareholder’s preference is not really binding and the maximum reservation price possible is 
strictly larger than the reservation price. For reservation prices larger than   *1eq ,,1 TFVW T  
(and up to the maximum value compatible with the creditor’s preferences 
  demax1eq ,,1 TFVW T ), the shareholder’s preference K  is really binding and it is the maximum 
level possible. Reservation prices K  above       demaxdemaxdemax1eq ,,1 TKTFVW T   are just 
irreconcilable with the creditor’s preference and the function  KK *  is simply not defined 
there. Anticipating next simulations, it is worth noticing that rescheduling in Figure 1 is 
possible or not depending on reservation prices. When the creditor’s reservation price is low 
with %20' , liquidation costs are high and the maximum extra period possible is rather 
long because   55.18'demax  . When the reservation price is higher with %40 , 
liquidation costs are still significant but smaller in magnitude. The maximum extra period 
possible is then shorter and equal to   33.10demax  . When the shareholder’s reservation 
price is constant and equal to 7K , the minimum extra period is   72.7eqmin K . For 
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5.10'K , it is   40.11'eqmin K . Consequently, when the shareholder’s reservation price is 
7K , a rescheduling is possible in both scenarios of liquidation costs. When it is equal to 
5.10'K , rescheduling is possible only for %20' . In that case, the creditor’s reservation 
price (function of the realization rate or equivalently liquidation costs) is not that 
constraining. In no case here, the optimal rescheduling advocated by Longstaff (1990) is 
feasible because both   *L  and  '*  L  indicate extra periods of time smaller than  Keqmin  
and  'eqmin K . 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 SOMEWHERE HERE 
 
Figure 2 illustrates effects of reservation prices. In the upper left hand graph, we 
reconsider the creditor’s net gain function drawn in Figure 1 (with associated key extra 
periods  '*  L  and  'demax  ) and we add two minimum extra periods required by the 
shareholder to cover reservation prices )'(eqmin K  and )"(eqmin K . We consider a couple of 
reservation prices here to help discussion ( 5.10'K  has been already considered in Figure 1 
while 1"K  is newly introduced for expositional reasons). The graph also emphasizes the 
net gain function value   '*debt  LH  at the optimal rescheduling horizon  '*  L , the cost of 
opportunity borne by the creditor if he chooses )'(eqmin K  for rescheduling and three different 
zones associated to 'K  and ' . “R Zone” points to possible extra periods for rescheduling, 
“NR Zone ‘C’” precises horizons above )'(demax   the creditor cannot choose and “NR Zone 
‘S’” indicates horizons below )'(eqmin K  the shareholder can only reject18. Because )'(eqmin K  
lies between  '*  L  and  'demax  , Proposition 4 predicts that the best choice for the extra 
period is the minimum horizon required by the shareholder )'(eqmin K . This is indeed the 
minimum opportunity cost the creditor can bear. By passing, extra periods associated to 
                                                     
18 Note that, for some range of parameters, very short horizons may be impossible for both the creditor and the 
shareholder (see footnote 12). 
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“small” reservation prices, like 1"K , appear smaller than  '*  L , so that the creditor can 
choose in this context the optimal rescheduling design with the consent of the shareholder.  
The upper right graph Figure 2 displays the shareholder’s benchmark function viewed as a 
function of extra periods of time 1TT   (along with key horizons and zoning). This graph 
shows that the shareholder is systematically better off increasing rescheduling maturity and it 
indicates how good a longer rescheduling is for her. 
The lower left graph completes the picture by providing the total value of the firm viewed as 
a function of extra periods of time 1TT  . Interestingly the firm’s total value is increasing 
with respect to the extra period of time granted by the creditor. Hence, a social planner in 
charge of the rescheduling and acting for the best of the firm as a whole (and as such 
employing the total firm value as a criterion) may decide a restructuring hurting the creditor’s 
interests and favoring the shareholder.  
The lower right graph sheds more lights finally on the stakeholders’ benchmark functions 
when eqmin  varies, i.e. when the shareholder’s reservation price is changing accordingly. We 
clearly observe the creditor’s opportunity cost increasing almost linearly when eqmin  increases 
beyond  '*  L . But, when the reservation price is moderate and eqmin  rather small (smaller 
that  '*  L  actually), the creditor does not care about it. Optimal rescheduling is possible 
there and most importantly he can enjoy the maximum net gain. For larger reservation price, 
the creditor must accept to grant a non-optimal rescheduling made of (at best) the extra 
period eqmin 19. The net gain function of the creditor decreases as the reservation price K 
increases, until rescheduling is no more feasible. When the period eqmin  is longer, the 
shareholder’s benchmark function decreases due to the increasing feature of the 
corresponding reservation price we can denote by  eqminK . Actually, this reflects the fact that 
when the period eqmin  is lower than  '*  L , the rescheduling period is in all cases set to  '*  L  
                                                     
19 The bargaining power of each party may then be important to determine what final horizon emerges within 
the range  demaxeqmin ,TT  (see section 5.3). 
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and the equity value does not change. Here only the reservation price varies within the 
benchmark function formula and the plot reveals that  eqminK  is a non linear function of eqmin . 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 SOMEWHERE HERE 
 
Let us now gain in Table 1 some numerical intuitions about the shareholder’s 
reservation price effect. We reconsider here quantitative scenarios studied by Longstaff 
(1990) in his Tables 1 and 2. For comparison purpose, parameter values are similar to those 
chosen by him, so that 341 TV , 401 F , %20 , %6r  and the magnitude of the 
realization rate   is ranging from 65% to 95% in the first column of Table 1. We also 
introduce the shareholder’s reservation price and set it to 1K . Columns 2 to 8 display 
simulations on the optimal rescheduling period   *L  solving the unconstrained optimization 
program (2), the longest rescheduling period possible for the creditor   demax , the minimum 
rescheduling period required by the shareholder  Keqmin , the creditor’s net gain function and 
the value of equity computed at the optimal rescheduling horizon advocated by Longstaff 
(1990) (    *debt LH  and    *LEq ) in the next two columns, and then the same computed at 
the optimal rescheduling horizon according to the constrained optimization problem (4) 
(    ,,
1
*
debt KVH T  and    ,,1* KVEq T ). Finally the maximum shareholder’s reservation 
price the environment can tolerate is given in column 8. The last and ninth column concludes 
with respect to the rescheduling decision.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 SOMEWHERE HERE 
 
Table 1 first emphasizes a grey zone to highlight situations where the creditor can effectively 
implement the Longstaff’s optimal rescheduling design. A simple way to check this is to 
search situations for which    ,,
1
* KVH Tdebt  is equal to    *debt LH  or equivalently where 
the value of equity is larger than the considered reservation price ( 1K ). We observe that 
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Longstaff’s solutions apply for realization rates up to and included %80 . The minimum 
horizon  Keqmin  implied by the (small) shareholder’s reservation price is indeed lower than 
the optimal period of time   *L . The first best choice of the creditor (   *L ) is then 
possible and reservation price ( 1K ) is not here a constraint. When realization rate is higher 
than 85%, things change dramatically. If   is equal to %85 , then rescheduling is still 
feasible because it is worth doing so for the creditor. One may check that     demaxeqmin K  
or equivalently that    ,,
1
* KVH Tdebt  is positive. But now, rescheduling is suboptimal for 
the creditor because    KL eqmin*    and the rescheduling duration can only be a second best. 
As suggested by Proposition 4, opportunity costs borne by the creditor can be assessed by 
subtracting    ,,
1
*
debt KVH T  to    *debt LH . Opportunity costs he faces here amount to 
      04.047.051.0,,
1
**
debt   KVHH TdebtL , which is about 8%. As expected from 
Figure 2 (see the lower right graph), the shareholder receives a claim here that is exactly 
worth 1 and covers her reservation price. It bounds the value of the claim she receives in case 
of rescheduling. By comparison to the canonical situation, her wealth has increased by about 
half ( 1.54
65.0
1  ). Interestingly, the absolute value of such an increase is higher than the 
opportunity cost borne by the creditor, stressing that this constrained rescheduling is socially 
beneficial. The magnitude of maxK  confirms finally that such an environment could have 
supported higher reservation price (up to 2.11). For betas equal to or greater than 90%, 
  demax  is now lower than  Keqmin  meaning that tolerances are irreconcilable and no 
rescheduling can occur without implementing an exit strategy (see section 5 for more 
information). There is just no more solution to the constrained optimization program (4) and 
hence no rescheduling possibility. Maybe this is not a so bad news because we simply avoid 
situations where (in view of columns    *debt LH  and    *LEq ) rescheduling is not that 
critical and the stake certainly negligible. The column dedicated to maxK  gives another way 
to understand the situation by showing how the maximum reservation price shareholders can 
accept is lower than the one we consider. 
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5. Further issues on corporate debt rescheduling with reservation prices 
What about agency costs in corporate debt rescheduling with reservation prices? How 
to avoid the failure of rescheduling negotiation? What about the influence of bargaining 
power in the rescheduling design? Next paragraphs elaborate on these questions within the 
extended structural framework. 
5.1. Ex post renegotiation moves and agency costs 
Recent evidences show that corporate policies significantly change following 
financial arrangement (Eisdorfer (2008), Esmer (2013)). Esmer (2013) finds for instance that 
risk-shifting occurs even in the presence of increased creditor’s control. One may expect this 
propensity to be exacerbated in stressed situations such as rescheduling negotiation20. In our 
setting; the firm’s assets’ volatility is the natural (and actually only) candidate to capture this 
issue. We expect from the traditional corporate finance literature agency concerns. 
To assess the extent to which the shareholder has incentives to change the volatility ex 
post renegotiation, we can simply compute         TEqTEq ,,%1   and 
       
  

TEq
TEqTEq
,
,,%1   these are the absolute and relative price differences of 
equity price when the firm’s assets volatility is changed (by a percentage % ) everywhere 
except in the determination of the rescheduling maturity. The absolute price difference is 
measured in euros or dollars, the relative one in percentage of the negotiated claim’s price. 
Corresponding agency costs may be computed by applying the same formulae to the debt 
price. We denote by  TClaim  and  TClaim%  the above measures, where Claim can 
stand for either debt or equity. 
                                                     
20 Two kinds of strategies can occur after the rescheduling decision. The first one modifies parameters involved 
in the (risk neutral) decision process. The second one modifies parameters that do not directly impact the 
pricing problem at renegotiation. Here we can think about the expected (objective) rate of return of the firm’s 
assets as a driver for such strategies… The real expected rate of return is currently hidden in the decision 
rescheduling process but it has potentiality to conciliate both parties. They should probably account for this 
earlier in the process i.e. during renegotiation. So we explore this point in a following paragraph.  
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Figure 3 plots two different graphs one for each measure. Both represent variations of 
debt and equity price on the same draw in order to compare magnitudes. We also consider a 
couple of rescheduling designs that are an optimal one designed by   *L  and an other one 
constrained by the shareholder’s reservation price and the rescheduling horizon  'eqmin K . 
Structural parameters are similar to those of previous Figures. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 SOMEWHERE HERE 
Let’s have a look first at volatility increasing from   to   %1 n  for positive % . 
As expected, both  TEq  and  TEq%  are strictly positive meaning that there is an 
incentive for the shareholder to increase the volatility ex post rescheduling. The right graph 
indicates that Eq%  almost doubles when %  is positive 
(      '2' eqmin%*% KEqEq L   ), meaning that the shareholder is significantly better off in 
relative terms by modifying the volatility of the optimal rescheduling. Another result is that 
the situation is not symmetric in the sense that the creditor does not face the loss that could 
correspond to the gain the shareholder enjoys (in both absolute and relative terms). The 
volatility effect is indeed not ranked the same, one has      '' eqmin%*% KDD L    and 
     '' *%eqmin%  LEKE   when %  is positive. Explanation for this comes from the 
total firm’s value, which does not stay the same when the volatility is modified. We can 
deduce from this that the shareholder can capture most of the created value. Let’s now have a 
look at volatility lowering from   to   %1 n  for negative % . As expected from 
corporate literature, there is no such incentive for the shareholder. Less intuitively, the effect 
is differently appreciated by the creditor. In line with standard theory, the creditor can be 
better off by lowering volatility, but this is not always the case if he designed rescheduling 
optimally. In such a case, the creditor can benefit from a small to moderate volatility change 
but he can then suffer from larger moves. The key driver of this is liquidation costs and the 
fact that the rescheduling horizon is fixed (and short). Lowering the volatility may decrease 
the (risk neutral) probability of recovery and increase the probability to face liquidation costs 
later. 
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5.2. How to make rescheduling feasible? 
In real life, rescheduling may actually fail for different reasons but the setting we 
consider suggest to have a look at some key determinants. First of all, the reservation price 
the shareholder has in mind may be too large or too steep (in case of a linear specification). 
To decrease the value or the slope of the reservation price, one may search for a “white 
knight” with lower requirements but still able to restore the firm21. This may force 
stakeholders to search actively for a key talent. Stakeholders can also change the firm’s 
business characteristics and modify either its risk profile (that is the volatility) or the 
intangible nature of assets (that is the realization rate) or both. These possible solutions affect 
stakeholders differently and we explore this now. 
Reservation price has clearly an impact on the shareholder’s tolerance for 
rescheduling (see the lower right graph of Figure 2 for early results on this). This is not 
however a possible lever for altering the creditor’s tolerance because the reservation price 
simply does not enter the (unconstrained) objective function of the creditor. So neither   *L  
nor  demaxT  depends on K . The benefit of lowering reservation price can be assessed by 
measuring how the horizon  KT eqmin  is changing when K  is modified. This function of K  is 
defined (implicitly) by    0;,, eqmin1debt 1 KKTFVH T . Within the extended canonical setting, 
simple calculus leads to  
 
       1eqmin,211eqmin,1
1
eq
min
eq
min
11
1
eq
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TTdNerFTTdn
TT
VK
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TTr
FV
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


   
where n stands for the normal cumulative distribution function. The value of this is of course 
positive but its magnitude can significantly change depending on parameters. 
Changing the firm’s business profile can significantly influence the design of 
rescheduling and the tolerance of shareholders. Parties may question industrial restructuring 
strategies that may be worth for both. Both the assets’ volatility   and the realization rate   
                                                     
21 Takacs (2011) shows for instance that in LBOs restructuring managers are fired in approximately 40% of 
cases. 
  
31
capture the business profile of the firm in our setting ;   stands for the business risk while 
  reveals the nature of assets in terms of tangibility, obsolescence, specificity, demand, etc. 
Analysis reveals that changing   is essentially of little help in our setting. First of all, this is 
not a lever for changing the shareholder’s tolerance because the horizon  KT eqmin  does not 
depend on K . For the creditor’s tolerance, calculus yieds to 
    
          1demax,11demax,211demax,1
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

And  it is not that clear whether this derivative is systematically negative for all ranges of 
structural parameters even if for most of them it is (see the left graph of Figure 1 for a typical 
example). So decreasing the realization rate increases the set of possible rescheduling 
horizons but the critical point here is that it also decreases the value the creditor can get in 
case of future default. This is not good news for the creditor so that he will certainly refuse. 
To see this analytically, one can verify that the first derivative of the debt value with respect 
to   (        212122121 1;,, 1debt TTTFVTTTrT dVVVfVeTFVD T  )is always positive.  
So, only a change in the firm’s risk profile could make rescheduling feasible and we 
expect both rescheduling design and tolerances to be impacted. Calculus in the structural 
setting leads to            1eqmin,211eqmin,1
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which is always negative so that (as expected)  eqminT  decreases when the firm’s assets 
volatility increases. By changing the firm’s asset volatility, one can change the tolerance of 
the representative shareholder. Analytical calculus for  


 debtmaxT  and  


 *LT  are possible 
too but their intricate expression does not unfortunately provide any clear expression 
especially to compare with  


 eqminT . So we use simulations and refer to Figure 4.  
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Figure 4 plots four graphs. The upper left graph illustrates, for a couple of business 
risk profiles, how lowering the shareholders’ reservation price decreases the minimum 
horizon required by the shareholder, viewed as a tolerance to rescheduling. The riskier the 
firm’s business, the more likely a (granted) extra period covers the shareholder’s reservation 
price; but the larger the effort (in terms of K) to lower the minimum horizon by a similar 
amount. Stakeholders may also think about increasing the business risk of the firm so as to 
relax in some ways the constraint induced by reservation prices. The upper right graph shows 
however this latter solution is not necessarily that straightforward to implement in our 
specific context. First of all, both  eqminT  and  demaxT  are indeed decreasing when the level 
of business risk is increasing. And second both interact to define the rescheduling. Hence, the 
challenge for stakeholders is to appreciate the relative speed of change of both horizons with 
respect to volatility. The upper right graph also sheds lights on this issue. We put together 
horizons associated to the creditor (solid lines) and the shareholder (dashed and dotted lines) 
given that she has a reservation price of 7 or 2.5. *LT ,  5.2eqmin KT ,  7eqmin KT  and demaxT  
are all functions of  . Inspection of  5.2eqmin KT  and  7eqmin KT  reveals that curves cross 
those of demaxT  and 
*
LT  proving that rescheduling may or may not be possible and that creditors 
can expect or not the maximum net gain function depending on the volatility they choose. 
Comments are in lines with properties highlighted in Table 122. The lower right graph sums 
up possible designs for rescheduling with a straight line when an optimal design is possible 
and doted or dashed lines for sub-optimal designs. The lower left graph plots corresponding 
                                                     
22 Let us first consider for instance K = 5.2 , it appears that rescheduling is always possible because 
de
maxT  is 
above  5.2eqmin KT  for all studied values of  . But, depending on the level of business risk, the maximum 
net gain function for the creditor is not necessarily achievable when deciding rescheduling. For   
approximately lower than or equal to 20%, the minimum horizon required by shareholders  5.2eqmin KT  is 
smaller than 
*
LT  the best horizon the creditor can choose: so that he can implement his optimal design. For 
higher values of  , he will choose  5.2eqmin KT  - the horizon required by the shareholder to cover 
reservation price. We know this horizon minimizes creditor’s opportunity costs, but also that the shareholder 
receives 5.2K  only (so whatever the volatility is). For higher values of reservation price, the rescheduling 
may be impossible. The curve associated to  7eqmin KT  is indeed higher than demaxT  for   approximately 
higher than 30%. In these business risk environments, tolerances are incompatible and irreconcilable. 
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prices of corporate debt. When design is always sub-optimal (like for K=7), we know that 
creditor chooses  eqminT  for rescheduling horizon and that the new equity is worth exactly K. 
Consequently, the shareholder will be indifferent to a change in volatility because the new 
possible volatility can only maintain     eqmindemax TT  . When the design is optimal (like for 
K=2.5 for small values of volatility), we stand in the canonical framework of Longstaff 
(1990) and we know thanks to Moraux and Navatte (2007) that there exists a suitable 
business risk level to target before entering renegotiation. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 SOMEWHERE HERE 
 
5.3 Introducing relative bargaining power 
The previous framework investigates situations where the creditor decides the 
rescheduling period at the best of his interest under the constraint that the considered 
rescheduling horizon remains acceptable by the representative shareholder. In many concrete 
situations, however, the representative shareholder can influence the rescheduling design i.e. 
can co-decide the length of the rescheduling period. Such a representative shareholder’s 
bargaining power goes beyond the simple veto previously considered. 
Mathematically, the net gain function of the representative shareholder enters the 
objective function and we face an asymmetric generalized Nash bargaining problem. The 
objective function to maximize is now made of both net gain function and it may be written : 
         KTFVHTFVHKTFVH TTT ;,,;,,,,;,, 11eq111debt11Nash 111   ,  
where the parameter   (such that 10  ) stands for the shareholder’s influence on the 
rescheduling duration (through the objective function) and where, symmetrically, 1  
represents the creditor's influence on the rescheduling duration through the objective 
function. This objective function maintains the net gain function of the creditor and the 
benchmark function of the shareholder both positive. In case 0 , the objective function to 
maximize is deH  that is the net gain function of the creditor and the shareholder has only a 
direct influence on the length of the rescheduling period through her veto. In case 1  (i.e. 
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01  ), the objective function to maximize is eqH  that is the benchmark function of the 
representative shareholder but the creditor enjoys a direct influence on the length of the 
rescheduling period through his veto. The above objective function is properly defined on a 
compact set of horizon only which is defined by        kTTkT eqmaxdemaxeqmin ,min;   in case linear 
reservation prices are considered and   demaxeqmin ;TT  for the constant case. Bounds of this set 
just pick the most constraining horizons. In any case, the optimal rescheduling period (if any) 
is 
       ,,;,,maxarg,,, 11Nash0* 11 KTFVHKV TT   . 
 
INSERT FIGURE 5 SOMEWHERE HERE 
 
Figure 5 plots NashH  the objective function associated to the asymmetric Nash bargaining 
game from the viewpoints of stakeholders. Graphs on the left are associated to the creditor 
while those on the right correspond to the representative shareholder. In upper graphs (Panel 
A), we set the reward for effort per unit of time to a moderate value of 5.0k  so as to 
maintain  keqmin  lower than  '*  L . In lower graphs (Panel B), we set the reward for effort 
per unit of time to a larger value so as to make  keqmin  greater than  '*  L . In absence of any 
Nash bargaining game, the creditor can implement his first best choice in Panel A, while he 
cannot in Panel B, where he can only consider his second best horizon. Considering now 

NashH  the objective function associated to the asymmetric Nash bargaining game, we observe 
that it is defined on a restricted set of horizons        kTTkT eqmaxdemaxeqmin ,min;   that its 
maximum points in all cases to durations significantly different from the first and second best 
ones. Hence, the bargaining game for the design of the rescheduling can dramatically 
influence the duration chosen by stakeholders… and even more significantly than the 
(simple) veto considered before. The marginal opportunity cost faced by the creditor due to 
the bargaining game (         KFVFV LTNashT eqmin*1*1 ,max,,Debt,,Debt 11   ) appears higher 
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than the one he faced by the existence of the veto (      KFVFV TLT eqmin1*1 ,,Debt,,Debt 11    
according to proposition 4).  
 
6. Empirical implications 
The model has in turn a list of testable implications. First ones concern potential 
determinants of an agreed rescheduling. Arrival of a rescuer or any change in the managing 
team may lower the reservation price K and may have a positive effect on the rescheduling 
negotiation. Simulations also stress that, for two firms facing similar reservation price, the 
probability of successful rescheduling should decrease with the level of the business risk. 
Terms of rescheduling can be useful to understand for external investors. First of all, they 
reveal information about the outcome creditor and shareholder expect. Second, terms of the 
agreement (once again) and the possible satisfaction of a shareholder’s reservation price can 
constitute strong evidences of perceived quality by insiders. A satisfying rescheduling 
agreement may help discriminate among distressed firms. Another important question to 
investigate empirically is whether a rescheduling decision has some predictive power on 
potential recovery of the firm 
Theory exposed in section 3 suggests different ways to make rescheduling possible. It could 
be interesting to study the strategic behavior of firm’s management before and after entering 
the (official) distress and rescheduling periods. Section 5 reveals that changing the business 
risk of the firm (that could be approximated by the standard deviation of firm's EBIT) or / 
and the realization rate β (specificity of assets, proportion of intangible assets) is a 
challenging but possible approach to find an agreement acceptable for shareholders. Why and 
in which situations alternative forms of agreement still subsist? Agency theory predicts that 
rescheduling can align interest of stakeholders better than debt write-off (see Harding and 
Sirmans (2002)). Finally, determinants of unsuccessful deals could also be worth 
investigating. As suggested here, both difficulties to restructure the existing firm’s assets and 
inefficiencies of the market for corporate control could matter. 
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7. Concluding remarks 
When a representative shareholder has a (constant or linear) reservation price, known 
results on rescheduling of distressed debt may change dramatically. This is a goal of this 
paper to investigate the extent to which both reservation prices restrict the set of possible 
horizons the creditor can choose to design the rescheduled debt. We derive, in a general 
distribution-free setting, various analytical results and highlight situations where 
rescheduling is worth for both parties and situations where the creditor can even achieve the 
best design possible (i.e. the optimal design obtained with no constraint). We characterize 
cases where rescheduling is simply unfeasible. Essentially, a rescheduling may be viewed as 
a meeting of tolerances. For running numerical simulations, we extend the canonical model 
of Longstaff (1990) and give quantitative conditions under which such rescheduling will not 
be accepted by a representative shareholder due to her reservation price. We consider various 
reservation prices, all other structural parameters being constant, and verify that relaxing 
constraints increases the solution set or other way saying the lower the reservation price of 
the creditor (respectively of the shareholder), the larger the set of maturities he (respectively 
she) can consider. 
This paper has in turn various managerial implications. When reservation price are 
not important, the question is whether the optimal rescheduling design can be achieved. 
When reservation price are significant, the question is whether a suboptimal rescheduling can 
take place. Both issues depend on the current business profile of the firm and the level of 
reservation price. These concerns leave a room for strategic decisions. Modifying the 
business profile is an issue of operational or industrial restructuring. This may be more or 
less feasible and costly, depending on the industry. Reducing reservation price may be an 
issue of changing current managers and representative shareholders. This could explain why 
shareholders occasionally fire managers when distress occurs (despite their knowledge, 
skills, experience, entrenchment in the firm) and why they sometimes just give up the firm 
and let new investors to come in. 
Here the rationale is to make rescheduling possible by lowering reservation price. If 
ever neither corporate rescuer nor raider can intervene, shareholders may benefit from this 
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situation. Actually, they can compel the debt holder to negotiate more than expected. Such a 
situation can explain bargaining power of poor performing manager and shareholders. 
Finally, our analysis suggests that the cutoff realization rate for refusing rescheduling is not 
one hundred percent as predicted by Longstaff (1990) but a lower value that depends on the 
shareholder’s profile. Our microeconomic approach can then be enriched from the banker’s 
perspective to account for portfolio risk concentration, competition, macroeconomic 
environment, regulation and other related issues. But such a richer agenda is left for future 
research. 
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Figure 1 : The creditor’s net gain function, the shareholder’s benchmark function, 
reservation prices and key horizons 
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Figure 1 plots the net gain function of the creditor in left upper graph, the benchmark function of the 
representative shareholder whose reservation  price is constant (right upper graph) or proportional to the 
duration (left lower graph) as functions of the extra period of time 1TT   (that can be chosen for 
rescheduling) for different levels of reservation prices. The lower right graph represents the function  KK *  
as a function of the reservation price. The left upper graph considers a couple of liquidation costs with fairly 
large values ( %40'  and %20' ) for illustrative purposes. It highlights for both cases i) the maximum 
net gain the creditor can get ))(( *debt LH   if he chooses the optimal rescheduling delay *L  and ii) the 
maximum rescheduling time-to-maturity he is ready to grant ( demax ). The right upper hand graph displays the 
shareholder’s benchmark function eq
H
 as a function of the extra period 1TT   for a couple of reservation 
price 7K  and 5.10'K . We highlight there minimum rescheduling durations  Keqmin  and  'eqmin K  
required to cover reservation prices. The lower left graph plots different possible scenarios arising when the 
reservation price is a linear function of the rescheduling duration. The base case sets the key parameter k  to 
85.0  and the other ones are chosen so as to figure out two interesting alternative situations (with respectively 
one and zero roots). Other parameters are 20
1
TV , 401 F , %30 , %10r . 
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Figure 2 : Reservation prices, values and opportunity costs 
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The upper left graph plots the creditor’s net gain function ( debtH ) as a function of extra periods  .“R Zone” 
points to extra periods admissible for rescheduling, The upper right graph plots the shareholder’s benchmark 
function ( eqH ) as a function of extra periods  . The lower left graph plots the total value of the firm. The 
lower right graph plots the creditor’s net gain as a function of the minimum horizon required by the shareholder 
to cover her reservation price. “NR Zone ‘C’” precises horizons the creditor cannot choose (so ‘C’) and “NR 
Zone ‘S’” indicate horizons the shareholder can only reject (so ‘S’) 
de
max  stands for the maximal period the 
creditor can accept, *L  for the optimal rescheduling period he should rationally choose in absence of 
reservation price. Parameters are those of Figure 1. See the core text for additional details. 
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Figure 3 :  Activism after rescheduling the corporate distressed debt: from agency costs 
to a agreed common strategy 
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The left graph plots absolute price differences (in euros) as functions of the new volatility   %1 n . 
The right graph plots relative price differences (in percentage) as functions of the new volatility 
  %1 n . We consider both the debt price and the equity price and a couple of reschedulings. The 
new volatility is expressed in percentage of the initial volatility: the abscissa is therefore % . Parameters are 
those of Figure 1.  
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Figure 4 : Stakeholders’ tolerance to rescheduling and the price of the corporate debt 
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The left upper graph plots the minimum rescheduling duration  Keqmin  as a function of the constant 
reservation for two different scenarios of business risk. The right upper graph represents various key durations 
used in our analysis. The left lower graph emphasizes the identity of the duration   ,,
1
* KVT  that solves the 
constrained optimization problem of equation (4). The right lower graph plots the value of the corresponding 
corporate debt. Parameters are V  = 34, 401 F ,  =20%, %6r  and the realization rate is set to 50 percent. 
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Figure 5 : The asymmetric Nash Bargaining game and the wealth of stakeholders 
Panel A : 5.0k . 
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Panel B : 86.0k . 
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This figure plots the objective function implied by the asymmetric Nash bargaining game (  NashH ) with the 
other two functions that matter for stakeholders. Left graphs are associated to the creditor’s viewpoint. Right 
graphs are associated to the shareholder’s viewpoint. For illustrative purposes, parameters are V  = 20, 1F =40, 
 =30%, r = 10%, the realization rate equals 20 percent and   0.6. The reservation price of the representative 
shareholder is linear with k =0.5 in upper graphs (panel A) and k =0.86 in lower graphs (panel B). 
 
 
Table 1: Rescheduling and Reservation price 
  (%)   *L    demax   Keqmin     *debt LH     *LEq     ,,1* KVH Tdebt     ,,1* KVEq T  maxK  Rescheduling 
65 1.47 5.30 0.79 2.82 2.25 2.82 2.25 8.51 
Yes with the 
Longstaff’s 
design 
70 1.24 4.11 0.79 2.13 1.83 2.13 1.83 6.72 
75 1.02 3.07 0.79 1.51 1.42 1.51 1.42 5.04 
80 0.80 2.16 0.79 0.96 1.02 0.96 1.02 3.49 
85 0.60 1.39 0.79 0.51 0.65 0.47 1 2.11 Yes 
90 0.40 0.77 0.79 0.19 0.31   0.96* No 
95 0.20 0.30 0.79 0.02 0.06   0.18* No 
The shareholder’s reservation price is set to 1K  Other structural parameters are those Longstaff (1990) use: V  = 34, 401 F ,  =20% and 
%6r . Shaded area signals values compatible with Longstaff’s findings. 
